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Graham Harman’s Prince of Networks is really two books in one.
The first part is a lucid exposition
of the metaphysics of Bruno Latour; the second part presents
Harman’s own metaphysical speculations, which are deeply indebted to those of Latour, but
which also strike out in new and
different directions.
Bruno Latour is well known in
the United States, but he is not
usually thought of as a philosopher
or a metaphysician. Latour is,
rather, most familiar as one of the
leading figures in science studies:
the interdisciplinary field that looks
at the actual practices of scientists
and scientific institutions, and the
cultural implications of these practices. Science studies involves the
work of sociologists, anthropologists, and historians, as well as of
cultural theorists and rhetoricians,
who are often to be found in literature departments. Latour is also
frequently cited as one of the developers of actor-network theory,
which has had a significant impact
in the social sciences and in cultural studies—but which has little
in common with the concerns of
the philosophy of science as it was
practiced in the last century under
the influence of such figures as
Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn.
It’s surprising, therefore (at least
for English-language readers,
though not necessarily for Frenchlanguage ones) to see Latour presented, as he is by Harman, as a
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metaphysician, in the company of
such figures as Leibniz, Hume,
Kant, and Whitehead. Indeed,
Harman suggests that Latour compares favorably with such figures
as Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze,
Lacan, and Badiou, those theorists
who have entranced American academia over the last several decades. One of the great merits of
Prince of Networks is that it not
only argues for the importance of
Latour’s thought, but also places
Latour himself in an entirely new
light.
In the first part of Prince of Networks, Harman outlines Latour’s
metaphysics through a close reading of four of Latour’s texts: “Irreductions” (from The Pasteurization
of France, 1984), Science in Action
(1987), We Have Never Been Modern (1991), and Pandora’s Hope
(1999). Harman discovers a cluster
of “four metaphysical axioms” that
define Latour’s philosophy (14–16).
In the first place, the world is made
up of actors or actants, discrete and
separate individuals. Human beings are actors, but so are bacteria,
chairs, grapes, and grains of sand.
In the second place, all these actors
are irreducible. No actor can be entirely explained in the terms of, or
by reference to, another. You cannot fully account for the being and
doing of a chair, for instance, by referring either to the atoms out of
which it is ultimately made or to its
use by the person who sits in it. In
the third place, any encounter, any
interaction between actors, in-

volves a process of translation. Each
actor mediates (and thereby transforms) other actors and is in its
own turn mediated (and thereby
transformed) by still other actors:
“There is never an immediate visibility of the fact, but only a series
of mediations. . . . Truth is nothing
but a chain of translation without
resemblance from one actor to the
next” (76). And finally, in the
fourth place, change happens as a
result of negotiations or battles
among actors; and the outcome of
these negotiations or battles depends upon the alliances that actors
are able to make with one another:
“For Latour, an object is neither a
substance nor an essence, but an
actor trying to adjust or inflict its
forces, not unlike Nietzsche’s cosmic vision of the will to power”
(15). After stating these axioms
concisely, Harman proceeds to
elaborate and develop them, and to
explore their ramifications and
consequences. The result is to reveal that Latour is actually grappling with many of the major
concerns of Western philosophy
and offering his own innovative
suggestions for resolving them.
In the second part of Prince of
Networks, Harman steps back from
this close reading, in order to offer
some criticisms of Latour’s metaphysics and to propose his own
metaphysical speculations as an alternative. Above all, Harman criticizes Latour for his relationalism:
“his notion that actors are defined
entirely by their relations and alli-
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ances.” For Latour, actors must be
“fully relational in character, with
no distinction between object and
accident, object and relation, or object and quality . . . to change one’s
relations is to change one’s reality”
(104). Harman objects that this dimension of Latour’s thought (which
he shares with Whitehead) risks
dissolving actors into a sort of primordial indistinction and effacing
their concrete individuality. Radical relationalism makes it difficult
to understand how an actor can
change over time. It also risks undermining the very actuality of actors that Latour otherwise wishes
to affirm, “by not allowing [an actor] to be real outside the alliances
that articulate it” (129). Harman
therefore suggests that—contrary
to Latour’s specific assertions, but
in tune with his basic intuitions—
actors must be accorded “a reality
beyond all relationality”; each actor (or object) must be “in and of
itself actual apart from any relations” (187). Latour’s own insistence
upon the actuality and efficacy of
actors, nonhuman as well as human, implies that each of these actors is necessarily “self-contained”
(144).
Harman’s own philosophy elaborates upon, and expands, this basic insight. In the second part of
Prince of Networks, Harman further develops, with the help of Latour, ideas that he had earlier
formulated in his previous books,
Tool-Being (2002) and Guerrilla
Metaphysics (2005). Among other

things, Harman remarkably revives, and gives new life to, two old
philosophical doctrines that, for
most of the last century, have been
regarded as old-fashioned, when
not forgotten entirely. The first of
these doctrines is substantialism:
the claim that every object is a substance, which is to say that it is
something more than the mere
sum of its qualities. The second of
these forgotten doctrines is occasionalism: the claim that objects
cannot influence one another directly—as in conventional notions
of cause and effect—but require
some external mediation in order
to do so. Harman suggests that
substantialism is the missing term
that could resolve many of the
problems that remain in Latour’s
metaphysics. And he credits Latour with the prodigious discovery,
for the first time in the history of
philosophy, of a secular occasionalism: a thought that considers seriously the problem of mediation in
any relationship among entities
without falling back upon God as
the ultimate mediator (102, 115,
228). Ever since Descartes, Western philosophy has called upon
God as the ultimate guarantor of
the world’s coherence; Latour is
the first thinker to envision this coherence in entirely immanent and
secular terms.
What unites both parts of Prince
of Networks is Harman’s quest, following Latour, to develop what he
calls an “object-oriented philosophy.” This is a view of the world
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that—in contrast to nearly all
Western philosophy since Kant, or
indeed since Descartes—is not
centered upon questions of consciousness, subjectivity, and the
epistemological problem of human
access to an external world. Rather,
object-oriented philosophy affirms
a “marvelous plurality of concrete
objects” (156), each with its own
integrity and its own mysterious
depths. The “universe of things” is
not a harmonious whole, but a
wild anarchy of innumerable objects both withdrawing from and
reaching out to one another. And
these objects cannot be contained
within the fixed categories that we
would seek to impose upon them.
Object-oriented philosophy is
therefore equally opposed to scientific naturalism and to so-called social constructionism. Against the
former, it insists that no object is
reducible to, or fully explicable in
terms of, its ultimate subatomic
constituents. Against the latter, it
insists that the world is not made
by us and for us. Cats, brown
dwarf stars, internal combustion
engines, and lava flows all have
their own stubborn autonomy and
inherent activity. Latour has often
been viewed, in the United States
at least, as a social constructionist,
but Harman demonstrates convincingly that this characterization
is wrong. Far from reducing the
physical world to a human projection, Latour’s philosophy orients
us, as never before, “toward the

richness of things themselves” in
all their multifariousness (119).
Prince of Networks marks something of a turning point, I think,
in contemporary intellectual discourse. For Harman’s reconstruction of Latour’s metaphysics, and
his presentation of his own metaphysics, both exemplify an important development in recent years:
the revival of metaphysical speculation. For most of the twentieth
century, “metaphysics” was taboo,
or under quarantine. It was generally seen as something bad, something we had to get away from.
The goal of overcoming metaphysics was shared by thinkers as otherwise antagonistic to one another as
Carnap and Heidegger. And despite the vast differences among
them, Wittgenstein, Rorty, and
Derrida were united at least by
their incessant efforts to undo the
bewitchment of metaphysics, even
if they all conceded that we would
never be able to escape this bewitchment entirely. But it seems
that this sort of attitude might finally be giving way. In the twentyfirst century, it might be possible,
once again, to do metaphysics
without a bad conscience. Harman
suggests as much, both through his
own bold speculations and through
what might be thought of as his
“outing” of Latour as an unabashed
metaphysician. The case of Latour
is especially significant in this respect because it demonstrates that
full-fledged metaphysical specula-
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tion is not incompatible with the
most careful, and hardheadedly
empirical, examination of local,
particular facts in minute detail.
Metaphysics, no less than scientific
examination, is a way of embracing “the richness of things themselves.” It is high time for us to
have done with the asceticism and
superciliousness of the last century’s intellectual climate. Metaphysical speculation, at its best, is a
stimulus to thought; Prince of Networks is profoundly engaging and
challenging even if one does not
accept (as I do not) all of its arguments.
In concluding, I should mention
that Prince of Networks is not just
intellectually stimulating, but also
a delight to read. Philosophy has
never been a matter of mere logical
propositions. It has always involved the elucidation of a basic
stance towards the world, which
means that it has always also involved a kind of literary style. A
manner of writing is not just an
adornment to the underlying ideas;
it is rather the case that ideas themselves can emerge only when they
are given the proper form of expression. Even the philosophers
who are most painful and obnoxious to read—one might mention
Kant, Hegel, and (for me at least)
Heidegger—have written the way
they did because they realized that
a new sort of language was required in order to convey their
new insights about reality. This is

all the more so, in the case of thinkers who can also be credited as
great writers: think of Plato, Hume,
Nietzsche, and William James.
Graham Harman is, similarly, a
philosopher who writes well. His
prose style is as seductive as his
ideas, and indeed it is impossible to
separate the two. Prince of Networks is a great adventure of ideas
(to use a phrase from Alfred North
Whitehead); it is one of those rare
books that, in style as in substance,
truly invites us to think.
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